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Abstract 
Gossip can promote cooperation via reputational concern. However, the relative effectiveness 
of positive and negative gossip in fostering prosociality has not been examined. The present 
study explored the influence of positive and negative gossip on prosocial behavior, using an 
economic game. Supporting previous evidence, it was found that individuals were more 
prosocial when gossip of any kind was possible, compared to when their behavior was 
completely anonymous. However, there was no significant difference in the efficiency in 
promoting cooperation between positive and negative gossip, suggesting that it is reputational 
concern elicited by gossip per se, rather than its valence, that stimulates prosociality.  
 
Keywords: gossip; reputation; prosocial behavior; cooperation 
  
GOSSIP VALENCE AND PROSOCIALITY    3 
 
The role of positive and negative gossip in promoting prosocial behavior 
People often display prosocial behavior in various forms (Penner et al., 2005; 
Schroeder & Graziano, 2014). However, this often involves costs to benefactors, and the 
prevalence of such costly behavior to benefit others has been a theoretical conundrum.  
Evolutionary perspectives have provided various theories explaining human 
prosociality, such as indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998, 2005), 
competitive altruism (Barclay & Willer, 2007; Fudenberg et al., 1986; Hardy & Van Vugt, 
2006; Roberts, 1998; Sylwester & Roberts, 2010; Van Vugt et al., 2012), and costly signaling 
theory (Gintis et al., 2001; Smith & Bliege Bird, 2000; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1999). Although 
their foci are different, these approaches converge on the idea that reputation should play an 
essential role in shaping human prosociality (for review, see Van Vugt et al., 2012; Wu, 
Balliet, & Van Lange, 2016b). In fact, a number of studies have demonstrated that individuals 
are more generous when their reputation is at stake. Namely, people are more prosocial, when 
a positive reputation brings indirect benefits (Milinski et al., 2002; Simpson & Willer, 2008; 
van Vugt & Hardy, 2010), when mere, implicit reputational cues are present (Haley & 
Fessler, 2005; Nettle et al., 2013), and when a reputation may be used for partner selection 
(Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006). 
Drawing upon the literature on reputation-based cooperation, researchers started 
investigating the potential role of gossip in cooperation (Dunbar, 2004). They repeatedly 
found that gossip promotes cooperation (Beersma & Van Kleef, 2011; Piazza & Bering, 
2008; Sommerfeld et al., 2007; J. Wu et al., 2015, 2016a, 2016c, 2019). Notably, Wu et al. 
(2015) revealed that gossip drove people to be more cooperative through reputational 
concern, rather than an expected indirect benefit. In addition, previous studies found that the 
influence of the potential to be gossiped about was present, when recipients of gossip could 
ostracize (Feinberg et al., 2014) and give a financial reward (Wu et al., 2015, 2016a, 2016c). 
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This suggests that gossip can promote cooperation regardless of positive or negative 
outcomes; individuals display prosocial behavior when gossip is possible, not only to gain 
positive outcomes but also avoid negative outcomes. 
However, despite the ample research on gossip valence (e.g., Ellwardt et al., 2012; 
Grosser et al., 2010; Kong, 2019; Tassiello et al., 2018; X. Wu et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2019; 
Zhou et al., 2019), preceding research has understudied the potential influence of positive vs. 
negative gossip in fostering cooperation. In other words, as noted by Wu et al. (2016b), the 
relative impact of positive and negative gossip in encouraging prosociality has not been 
studied yet. Past research employed a gossip manipulation in which participants were told 
that another person could send an evaluative message to their future interaction partner(s) 
(Romano, Balliet, & Wu, 2017; Wu et al., 2015, 2016a, 2016c). Moreover, it is by no means 
inevitable that individuals only seek a positive reputation (Emler, 1990, 2019). Thus, it 
remains unclear whether individuals in Wu and colleagues’ studies were more prosocial 
because of fear of negative gossip or desire for positive gossip, or whether it is simply 
reputational concern per se that matters. Therefore, investigating the role of positive vs. 
negative gossip is of vital importance to further elucidate the influence of gossip in 
cooperation.  
Thus, the present study aimed to examine the relative impact of positive and negative 
gossip on prosocial behavior. It was hypothesized that individuals would be more cooperative 
when their behavior could be gossiped about to their future partner, regardless of its valence.  
We had no a priori hypotheses about the comparison between positive and negative gossip, 
and the study was designed to explore whether any differences would arise. In addition, 
following previous studies (e.g., Wu et al., 2015), we also measured reputational concern so 
that we could test the mediating role of reputational concern in the cooperation-promoting 
role of gossip.   
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Method 
Participants and Design 
The study followed a 1 x 4 (condition: positive gossip vs. negative gossip vs. control 
gossip vs. no gossip) between-subject design. A priori power analysis (G*Power 3.1; Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) revealed that 232 participants were required to detect a 
medium effect size to have a statistical power of .90. To account for any exclusions, 240 
students at a British University were recruited to take part in an online experiment in 
exchange for credits. Twenty-eight participants did not fully complete the study, leaving 212 
participants for analyses.  
Procedure 
We followed the procedure in (Wu et al., 2015, Study 1). Participants (Person A) were 
told that they would complete two scenarios with two other participants (Person B and Person 
C): a dictator game (DG) and a trust game (TG). However, in actuality, participants were not 
matched with anybody online and Person B and C were hypothetical confederates. In the DG, 
participants were endowed 100 lab points (1 point = £0.1) and asked to decide the division of 
the points between themselves and Person B. The number points that they decided to give to 
Person B was the indicator of prosocial behavior.  
Participants (Person A) were instructed to act as a trustee in the TG with Person C as 
a trustor. In the TG, the trustor (Person C) was given 100 lab points and asked to decide how 
many points they would like to transfer to Person A (participants). Any amount of money that 
they sent was tripled, and Person A then had an opportunity where they could return some 
money to Person C.  
In the no gossip condition, participants did not get any instruction about gossip. In the 
control gossip condition, the instruction read, “Person B can send any messages regarding 
your decision to Person C.” In the positive gossip condition, it read, “Person B can tell Person 
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C how kind, cooperative, and trustworthy you are.” Lastly, in the negative gossip condition, 
these three adjectives for the positive gossip condition were replaced with mean, selfish, and 
untrustworthy, respectively. After participants read the instruction about the DG, TG, and the 
gossip manipulations, they were presented comprehension questions (e.g., “what kind of 
evaluative message can Person B send to Person C?” with four choices “how kind, 
cooperative, and trustworthy you are”, “how mean, selfish, and untrustworthy you are”, 
“Person B cannot send any messages to Person C”, and “Person B can send any feedback on 
your allocation decision to Person C”). Then, they proceeded to the DG.  
After the DG, participants completed a reputational concern measure. Reputational 
concern was measured by five items (α = .82, adapted from Wu et al., 2015). They were five-
point scales ranging from 1 = “Totally disagree” to “Totally agree” (e.g., “It’s important that 
others will accept me”). They also indicated how much they thought Person C would transfer 
in the TG, which was used as the measurement of expected indirect benefit. The TG did not 
take place, and they were debriefed and thanked.      
Results 
Firstly, using a comprehension question, “what kind of evaluative message can Person 
B send to Person C?” we strictly excluded 35 participants who failed to provide the right 
answer from the dataset, as the question was crucial for the gossip manipulation. This left 177 
participants for the subsequent analyses. The exclusion rate reached 17% which should not 
substantially deviate from the normal rate, as Hauser and Schwarz (2016) fund that students’ 
passing rate of instrumental manipulation checks at various universities varied from roughly 
70% to 80%.    
Prosocial Behavior  
Hypothesis-relevant contrasts were created: Contrast 1 (no gossip condition vs. the 
remaining three gossip conditions), Contrast 2 (positive and negative gossip condition vs. 
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control gossip condition), and Contrast 3 (positive vs. negative gossip condition). A one-way 
ANOVA on prosocial behavior in the DG revealed that the main effect of the gossip 
manipulation was significant, F (3, 173) = 3.66, p = .01, partial η2 = .06, 95% CI for the 
effect size [.002, .13] (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations for each condition). 
Post hoc power analysis indicated that the study was sufficiently powered after the exclusion 
(statistical power = 0.81).  
The planned comparison indicated that individuals in the three gossip conditions gave 
a significantly larger amount of money to the receiver compared to those in the no gossip 
condition, t (173) = 3.09, p = .002. However, Contrast 2 and 3 were not significant, 
Contrast2: t (173) = 0.82, p = .42; Contrast 3: t (173) = 0.55, p = .58. This suggested that 
gossip promotes cooperation regardless of whether its content is positive or negative.   
Reputational concern 
A one-way ANOVA on reputational concern revealed the significant effect of the 
condition, F (3, 173) = 5.78, p = .001, partial η2 = .09, 95% CI for the effect size [.02, .17]. 
Contrast 1 was also significant, t (173) = 3.99, p < .001. Contrast 2 and 3 did not have 
significant effects, t (173) = 1.17, p = .24; t (173) = -0.33, p = .74, respectively (see Table 1 
for means and standard deviations for each condition). Thus, gossip, regardless of its content, 
significantly elicited reputational concern.  
Mediation Analysis  
Following Wu et al., (2015), we tested whether gossip promoted prosocial behavior 
via reputational concern and expected indirect benefit, using Contrast 1 as the independent 
variable. The total effect of Contrast 1 on prosocial behavior was significant, b = 2.36, p = 
.001. The direct effect was also significant, b = 1.96, p = .009. The path coefficients between 
Contrast 1 and reputational concern was significant, b = 0.56, p < .001. The path between 
reputational concern and prosocial behavior was marginally significant, b = 2.84, p = .07. For 
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indirect effects, the bias-corrected bootstrapping method was employed to compute 95% 
confidence intervals. The indirect effect through reputational concern did not reach statistical 
significance, yet it was marginally significant, b = 0.40, p = .09, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.87]. The 
effect through expected indirect benefit, by contrast, was not significant, b = .006, p = .97, 
95% CI [-0.31, 0.32]. Although the conventional threshold for statistical significance did not 
allow us to provide full support for the influence of gossip via reputational concern on 
cooperation (Wu et al., 2015), the pattern seemed to be consistent with the previous finding.  
Discussion 
We investigated whether positive or negative gossip would differently promote 
cooperation. To our knowledge, this was the first study that has directly compared the relative 
effect of positive and negative gossip. As expected, participants were more generous when 
any kind of gossip was possible, compared to when there was no potential to be gossiped 
about. Thus, the present study added further support for Wu and colleagues’ previous 
findings. However, the content of gossip, positive or negative, did not alter individuals’ 
motivation to display prosocial behavior.  
Our findings suggest that risks to both negative and positive reputation systems have 
equivalent effects, promoting cooperation despite the possibility that potential outcomes of 
positive or negative reputation might be quite different. Specifically, individuals are willing 
to incur costs to gain a positive reputation to the same extent as they are to avoid a negative 
reputation. This is in line with research indicating that honor and shame can both drive 
cooperation (Jacquet et al., 2011), as well as the idea that individuals are not necessarily 
motivated only to establish a positive reputation with all types of observer (Emler, 2019).  
Furthermore, our findings imply that individuals are less sensitive to how others 
construe and gossip about their behavior than to the simple fact that their reputation is open to 
review. In other words, it seems that the influence of the potential of being gossiped about is 
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independent of one’s expectation about how intermediaries (i.e., gossipers) may comment. 
What drives cooperation is apparently the fact that a future interaction partner will be given a 
characterological context in advance of responding to the participant’s behavior. 
It should be noted, however, that the instruction for participants in the control 
condition did not mention gossip and the observed effect of gossip on prosocial behavior 
could be partly explained by this; one could argue that the mere reference to gossip promoted 
prosocial behavior. We demonstrated that gossip exerted the influence via reputational 
concern, but future studies could eliminate the alternative explanation by employing a control 
condition that at least mentions gossip (e.g., the gossip-to-unrelated-persons condition; Wu et 
al., 2015)    
In addition, the generalizability of the finding might be limited to the abstract setting. 
In reality, people live in groups, and negative reputation accompanied by negative 
consequences such as ostracism loom larger than positive reputation in real life (Buss & 
Haselton, 2000; Yamagishi et al., 2007). Furthermore, the significance of negative reputation 
might be more pronounced, for example, in cultures where social exclusion has a serious 
consequence (Uskul & Over, 2017; Yamagishi, Hashimoto, & Schug, 2008). Thus, future 
research should address the role of positive and negative reputation in relation to ecological 
and cultural contexts, extending our findings from the abstract setting. Additionally, the use 
of economic games of different nature (e.g., involving social dilemma) should also provide 
additional value to our findings in terms of the generalizability (Milinski, 2019). 
Overall, despite potential limitations, the present study has established a sound 
method with which to test the effect of gossip contents and has provided the first empirical 
test of the relative influence of positive versus negative gossip. Further studies should shed 
light on the potential impact of the valence of gossip content in a variety of contexts to 
replicate, extend and qualify this new evidence.  
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Table 1.  
Means and standard deviations of endowment in the DG and reputational concern by 
condition 
        
 Prosocial behavior  Reputational concern 
  M (SD)   M (SD) 
Positive gossip 49.60 (15.91)  3.77 (0.85) 
Negative gossip 47.44 (14.54)   3.83 (0.10)  
Control gossip 45.73 (16.75)  3.61 (1.11) 
No gossip 38.30 (22.45)   3.18 (0.74) 
 
 
 
 
